The email autolink clause also matched a link whose only child is an
element, raised on "mailto:" <> element, and the rescue turned the
whole post into escaped source text.
ConfigDB turns a numeric proxy host into an IP tuple. Hackney 1 took it,
Hackney 4 ignores such a proxy and connects directly, which skips a
SOCKS proxy (Tor) without any error.
- An admin-set cacerts no longer gets the CAStore cacertfile added;
Hackney drops cacerts when both are set.
- Set proxy_ssl_options too: with an HTTPS proxy, Hackney 4 uses them
for the proxy connection and falls back to certifi.
- Hackney 4 ignores the top-level insecure option and uses certifi.
Turn it into an explicit verify_none.
The Qdrant and OpenAI clients do not go through Pleroma.HTTP, so on
Hackney they trusted certifi. Both send API keys. Give them the
configured adapter with the same TLS options.
Hackney 4 merges given ssl_options into its defaults and keeps its own
partial_chain, which trusts any certificate in the peer chain that is in
certifi. A peer could send the emSign ECC Root CA - G3 root in its chain
and pass. Set partial_chain so certifi is never a trust anchor.
Mint trusts the OTP CA store, which comes from the OS. Load the CAStore
bundle into it when Finch starts, so Finch trusts the same roots as the
other adapters.
The TLS version override replaced all Hackney TLS defaults. On OTP 26+
this fails with cacerts: :undefined; on older OTP it skipped certificate
checks. Closes#7962 on the public tracker.
Hackney trusts its own certifi bundle, which still has the roots of the
compromised eMudhra intermediate CAs. Pass explicit ssl_options with the
CAStore bundle. Hackney drops all its TLS defaults when ssl_options are
given, so keep peer and hostname checks in the options.
Wrap the followed ap_ids subselect in keep_following_or_not_domain_blocked
in ARRAY(...) so it becomes an InitPlan. As a plain subselect the planner
charged its startup per rescan of the actor lookup, which could make
Notification.for_user pick a plan that scans every active user per row.
A partial revert, keeping the updated @inline_content_types list and
cosmetic changes.
This reverts commit 4fe567064a, reversing
changes made to 9b8aa2e2ee.
Serve a response announcing far more than it sends, then close, and
assert the connection process is gone. Fails against stock 4.7.2 with a
conn parked in `closed` holding the bytes it read; passes against the
pinned fix.
Also stop the Hackney tests trusting proxy environment variables.
`no_proxy_env` is not a Hackney option and never was, so a proxy in the
build environment silently turned these into tunnelled requests, which
are never pooled -- exactly the shape several of them mean to exclude.
`proxy: false` is what Hackney actually reads.
That surfaced a matching bug in the reverse proxy client, which treated
`proxy: false` as "a proxy is set" and so declined to mark a pooled
bodyless response as already released.
Hackney 4 ignores `with_body` and always returns a fully read binary, so
Tesla.Adapter.Hackney never reaches the clause that honours :max_body and
the option became a no-op. Only the gun path still enforced it, through
Pleroma.HTTP.Adapter.Gun. Pleroma.Web.RelMe relies on nothing else, so it
was fetching remote pages unbounded.
Add a middleware that applies the limit for every adapter: reject when
content-length already announces too much, and reject a body that came
back over the limit. Streaming bodies are left alone -- neither adapter
limits those and the caller owns the lease, so failing here on the header
would strand a connection RichMedia is still expected to release.
On the hackney path this bounds what callers are handed rather than peak
memory, since the adapter has read the body before any middleware runs.
