feat(signature): add a freshness and coverage policy for incoming signatures

Signature.check_signature_policy/2 requires date or (created) to be
signed and within signature_max_age (2 h) / signature_max_clock_skew
(1 h), and requires a signed, hashed digest for requests with a body.

Based on Akkoma's http_signatures fork (required headers, max_sig_age)
and Mastodon's SignedRequest (clock skew margin).
This commit is contained in:
Lain Soykaf 2026-10-27 21:46:40 +04:00
commit f57e97bf18
No known key found for this signature in database
5 changed files with 234 additions and 0 deletions

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@ -373,6 +373,9 @@ config :pleroma, :activitypub,
note_replies_output_limit: 5,
sign_object_fetches: true,
authorized_fetch_mode: false,
signature_policy: :enforce,
signature_max_age: 7200,
signature_max_clock_skew: 3600,
client_api_enabled: false,
anonymize_reporter: false,
anonymize_reporter_local_nickname: ""

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@ -1788,6 +1788,27 @@ config :pleroma, :config_description, [
description:
"List of IPs (CIDR format accepted) to exempt from HTTP Signatures requirement (for example to allow debugging, you shouldn't otherwise need this)"
},
%{
key: :signature_policy,
type: {:dropdown, :atom},
description:
"What to do with incoming HTTP signatures that do not sign the date (or `(created)`), are outside the allowed time window, or do not sign the digest of a request body. `:enforce` treats them as invalid, `:log` only logs them",
suggestions: [:enforce, :log]
},
%{
key: :signature_max_age,
type: :integer,
description:
"How old, in seconds, the signed date of an incoming HTTP signature can be. Default: 7200 (2 hours)",
suggestions: [7200]
},
%{
key: :signature_max_clock_skew,
type: :integer,
description:
"How far, in seconds, the signed date of an incoming HTTP signature can be in the future. Default: 3600 (1 hour). A `(created)` time in the future is always rejected",
suggestions: [3600]
},
%{
key: :note_replies_output_limit,
type: :integer,

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@ -286,6 +286,9 @@ Notes:
* `sign_object_fetches`: Sign object fetches with HTTP signatures
* `authorized_fetch_mode`: Require HTTP signatures for AP fetches
* `authorized_fetch_mode_exceptions`: List of IPs (CIDR format accepted) to exempt from HTTP Signatures requirement (for example to allow debugging, you shouldn't otherwise need this)
* `signature_policy`: What to do with incoming HTTP signatures that do not sign the `date` header (or `(created)`), whose signed date is outside the window below, or that do not sign the `digest` header of a request with a body (or whose body Pleroma did not hash). `:enforce` (default) treats them as invalid, `:log` only logs a warning.
* `signature_max_age`: How old, in seconds, the signed date of an incoming HTTP signature can be. Default: `7200` (2 hours).
* `signature_max_clock_skew`: How far, in seconds, the signed `date` of an incoming HTTP signature can be in the future. Default: `3600` (1 hour). A `(created)` time in the future is always rejected.
## Pleroma.User

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@ -95,6 +95,84 @@ defmodule Pleroma.Signature do
Timex.format!(date, "{WDshort}, {0D} {Mshort} {YYYY} {h24}:{m}:{s} GMT")
end
@doc """
Checks the parts of an incoming signature that the cryptographic check does
not cover, so that a captured request cannot be replayed later or with a
different body.
The signature must cover `date` or `(created)`, and the signed time must be
within the configured window. Requests other than GET and HEAD must also
sign `digest`, and DigestPlug must have hashed their body. Based on Akkoma's http_signatures fork and Mastodon's
SignedRequest.
"""
@spec check_signature_policy(Plug.Conn.t(), DateTime.t()) :: :ok | {:error, atom()}
def check_signature_policy(%Plug.Conn{} = conn, now \\ DateTime.utc_now()) do
signature = HTTPSignatures.signature_for_conn(conn)
signed = Map.get(signature, "headers", [])
cond do
"date" not in signed and "(created)" not in signed ->
{:error, :date_not_signed}
conn.method not in ["GET", "HEAD"] and "digest" not in signed ->
{:error, :digest_not_signed}
# The plug puts the digest computed by DigestPlug into the header. With
# no computed digest (e.g. multipart), nothing checked the body.
conn.method not in ["GET", "HEAD"] and is_nil(conn.assigns[:digest]) ->
{:error, :body_not_hashed}
true ->
with :ok <- check_signed_date(conn, signed, now) do
check_signed_created(signature, signed, now)
end
end
end
defp check_signed_date(conn, signed, now) do
if "date" in signed do
# Exactly one header: a second one could make this check and the
# signature check see different dates.
with [date] <- Plug.Conn.get_req_header(conn, "date"),
{:ok, %DateTime{} = date} <- Timex.parse(date, "{RFC1123}") do
check_time_window(date, now)
else
_ -> {:error, :invalid_date}
end
else
:ok
end
end
defp check_signed_created(signature, signed, now) do
if "(created)" in signed do
with created when is_binary(created) <- signature["created"],
{created, ""} <- Integer.parse(created),
{:ok, created} <- DateTime.from_unix(created) do
check_time_window(created, now)
else
_ -> {:error, :invalid_date}
end
else
:ok
end
end
defp check_time_window(signed_at, now) do
age = DateTime.diff(now, signed_at)
cond do
age > Pleroma.Config.get([:activitypub, :signature_max_age], 7200) ->
{:error, :date_too_old}
-age > Pleroma.Config.get([:activitypub, :signature_max_clock_skew], 3600) ->
{:error, :date_in_future}
true ->
:ok
end
end
@spec validate_signature(Plug.Conn.t(), String.t()) :: boolean()
def validate_signature(%Plug.Conn{} = conn, request_target) do
# Newer drafts for HTTP signatures now use @request-target instead of the

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@ -116,6 +116,135 @@ defmodule Pleroma.SignatureTest do
end
end
describe "check_signature_policy/2" do
@now ~U[2026-10-27 12:00:00Z]
defp policy_conn(method, signed_headers, extra_headers, extra_params \\ "") do
signature =
"keyId=\"https://remote.example/users/a#main-key\",headers=\"#{signed_headers}\"" <>
extra_params <> ",signature=\"fake\""
%Plug.Conn{
method: method,
req_headers: [{"signature", signature}, {"host", "pleroma.example"} | extra_headers],
assigns: %{digest: "SHA-256=abc"}
}
end
defp date_header(seconds_ago) do
date = DateTime.add(@now, -seconds_ago) |> DateTime.to_naive()
{"date", Signature.signed_date(date)}
end
test "accepts a fresh signed GET (Pleroma, Mastodon, Misskey style)" do
for headers <- ["(request-target) host date", "(request-target) host date accept"] do
conn = policy_conn("GET", headers, [date_header(10)])
assert Signature.check_signature_policy(conn, @now) == :ok
end
end
test "accepts a fresh signed POST covering the digest" do
conn =
policy_conn("POST", "(request-target) host content-length digest date", [
date_header(10),
{"digest", "SHA-256=abc"}
])
assert Signature.check_signature_policy(conn, @now) == :ok
end
test "accepts (created) instead of date (GoToSocial style)" do
created = DateTime.to_unix(@now) - 10
conn =
policy_conn(
"POST",
"(request-target) (created) host digest",
[{"digest", "SHA-256=abc"}],
",algorithm=\"hs2019\",created=#{created}"
)
assert Signature.check_signature_policy(conn, @now) == :ok
end
test "rejects signatures that cover neither date nor (created)" do
conn = policy_conn("GET", "(request-target) host", [date_header(10)])
assert Signature.check_signature_policy(conn, @now) == {:error, :date_not_signed}
end
test "rejects a body request whose digest is not signed" do
conn =
policy_conn("POST", "(request-target) host date", [
date_header(10),
{"digest", "SHA-256=abc"}
])
assert Signature.check_signature_policy(conn, @now) == {:error, :digest_not_signed}
end
test "rejects a signed date that is missing or unparsable" do
conn = policy_conn("GET", "(request-target) host date", [])
assert Signature.check_signature_policy(conn, @now) == {:error, :invalid_date}
conn = policy_conn("GET", "(request-target) host date", [{"date", "yesterday"}])
assert Signature.check_signature_policy(conn, @now) == {:error, :invalid_date}
end
test "rejects more than one date header" do
conn =
policy_conn("GET", "(request-target) host date", [date_header(10), date_header(9000)])
assert Signature.check_signature_policy(conn, @now) == {:error, :invalid_date}
end
test "rejects a signed digest when the body was not hashed" do
conn =
policy_conn("POST", "(request-target) host date digest", [
date_header(10),
{"digest", "SHA-256=abc"}
])
|> Map.put(:assigns, %{})
assert Signature.check_signature_policy(conn, @now) == {:error, :body_not_hashed}
end
test "rejects a signed date that is too old or too far in the future" do
clear_config([:activitypub, :signature_max_age], 7200)
clear_config([:activitypub, :signature_max_clock_skew], 3600)
conn = policy_conn("GET", "(request-target) host date", [date_header(7200)])
assert Signature.check_signature_policy(conn, @now) == :ok
conn = policy_conn("GET", "(request-target) host date", [date_header(7201)])
assert Signature.check_signature_policy(conn, @now) == {:error, :date_too_old}
conn = policy_conn("GET", "(request-target) host date", [date_header(-3600)])
assert Signature.check_signature_policy(conn, @now) == :ok
conn = policy_conn("GET", "(request-target) host date", [date_header(-3601)])
assert Signature.check_signature_policy(conn, @now) == {:error, :date_in_future}
end
test "rejects a (created) timestamp that is too old" do
clear_config([:activitypub, :signature_max_age], 60)
created = DateTime.to_unix(@now) - 61
conn =
policy_conn("GET", "(request-target) (created) host", [], ",created=#{created}")
assert Signature.check_signature_policy(conn, @now) == {:error, :date_too_old}
end
test "uses the cavage default of a signed date when headers are not given" do
conn = %Plug.Conn{
method: "GET",
req_headers: [{"signature", "keyId=\"https://remote.example/users/a#main-key\""}]
}
assert Signature.check_signature_policy(conn, @now) == {:error, :invalid_date}
end
end
describe "key_id_to_actor_id/1" do
test "it properly deduces the actor id for misskey" do
assert Signature.key_id_to_actor_id("https://example.com/users/1234/publickey") ==